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Abstract 
When observing ostracism, individuals can either side with the target or the sources of 
ostracism. Here we demonstrate that side-taking depends on whether the target previously 
acted in adherence to or in violation of perceived social norms. In four studies, a target 
behaved either norm-consistently or violated a social norm, and was subsequently either 
excluded by the sources or was not. Next, participants could sanction the behavior of the 
observed persons by refraining to assign money (Studies 1 and 2), or by subtracting money 
from a bonus (Studies 3 and 4). Observers assigned less money to the sources when these 
excluded a norm-consistent target. However, when the target had violated a social norm 
before, participants assigned less money to the target instead. These results have far-reaching 
implications because the (in)actions of neutral individuals can legitimize the sources’ 
behavior, or help a target under attack. 
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Ostracism and social exclusion are ubiquitous phenomena that oftentimes involve 
observers witnessing the ostracism situation. Many contributions have shown that observers 
empathize with the ostracized target and try to help or compensate him/her (see Wesselmann, 
Williams, & Hales, 2013), as well as punish the ostracizing sources for their inadequate 
behavior (Güroğlu, Will, & Klapwijk, 2013; Over & Uskul, 2016; Will, Crone, van den Bos, 
& Güroğlu, 2013). However, sometimes observers choose to do nothing, or even turn against 
the target themselves (Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, Reeder, & Williams, 2013). Here, we 
introduce norm-consistency of the target’s behavior as one key moderator that explains 
whether observers perceive ostracism as unfair behavior of the sources that needs to be 
sanctioned, or a legitimate means to punish the target. More specifically, we suggest that if 
the target behaved consistently with social norms, participants will perceive ostracism as 
unacceptable, unfair behavior that needs to be sanctioned. However, when the target has 
violated social norms, ostracism is likely to be perceived as a legitimate means to punish the 
target for the deviation and, thus, constitutes a more acceptable behavior.  
Understanding observers’ side-taking is critical, since plenty of research has shown 
that ostracism is highly painful and threatening for its targets (for an overview, see Blackhart, 
Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Hartgerink, van Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015; 
Williams, 2009). Far less work has focused on the role of observers, who have the potential to 
make a difference by providing support and acknowledgement for ostracized targets, be it in 
an educational context, at work, or at home (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2019; Rudert, Hales, 
Greifeneder, & Williams, 2017). Yet, observers will not always side with the target and under 
certain conditions they may even join in ostracizing the target (Rudert, Reutner, Greifeneder, 
& Walker, 2017; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013; Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, Reeder, & 
Williams, 2015). Thus, from a theoretical as well as a practical perspective, it is critical to 
understand how observers make moral judgements and how these judgements affect 
subsequent behavior. 
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Ostracism and Social Norms 
Individuals’ behavior in social contexts is often driven and constrained by social 
norms that act as mental representations of appropriate situational behavior in a specific 
context (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Social norms typically entail (a) 
a collective agreement on how individuals ought to act in a situation, (b) an expectation that 
they will act in accordance with the norm, as well as (c) the probability that violations of the 
social norm will be punished by others (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Gibbs, 1965). While social 
norms may sometimes take the form of explicit rules, oftentimes they develop implicitly out 
of individuals’ day-to-day interactions.  
As social beings who thrive on cooperation, the default social norm in many human 
societies is one of inclusion. Thus, individuals have the normative expectation to be included 
in groups or ongoing activities, such as ball games or social activities (Rudert & Greifeneder, 
2016; Wesselmann, Butler, Williams, & Pickett, 2010; Wesselmann, Wirth, & Bernstein, 
2017). Ostracism without any apparent reason violates this default inclusion norm and is 
generally perceived as unfair or hostile (Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Tuscherer et al., 2015). 
For this reason, it is not surprising that many studies show that observers empathize with the 
target (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009) and 
punish the sources, for instance, by decreasing their payoffs or choosing unequal distributions 
in a dictator game (Güroğlu et al., 2013; Over & Uskul, 2016; Will et al., 2013). Observers 
even choose to punish at their own expense, that is, when punishment has financial costs 
(Güroğlu et al., 2013; Will et al., 2013). 
But groups and societies know social norms other than the inclusion norm, too, such 
as honesty, trustworthiness, or contributions to collective goods, and upholding these other 
social norms may prove vital for a group’s or society’s survival. One means of upholding 
social norms is ostracizing those who are deviant (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016; Stamkou, van 
Kleef, Homan, & Galinsky, 2016). In this case, ostracism serves a greater good and should be 
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accepted as legitimate by observers (punitive ostracism; Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998). As 
a consequence, observers should side with the sources and neither compensate the target nor 
sanction the sources for their ostracizing behavior. Consistent with this notion, Wesselmann 
and colleagues (2013) showed that individuals no longer compensated an ostracized target 
when s/he threw the ball in a ball-tossing game more slowly than everyone else. 
From this norm perspective, it is critical to understand which social norms are at play 
when individuals observe ostracism. Being the default, the inclusion norm is primary (Pryor, 
Reeder, Wesselmann, Williams, & Wirth, 2013; Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Wesselmann, 
Wirth, et al., 2013). As has been demonstrated in previous research (Rudert, Sutter, Corrodi, 
& Greifeneder, 2018), when there is no apparent reason for ostracizing the target, observers 
attribute ostracism to malicious motives of the sources and consequently evaluate the sources 
negatively compared to the target, such as being less interested in cooperating with them, as 
well as reporting more anger and less sympathy towards the sources. In contrast, when 
observers perceive ostracism as a justified punishment, they are more likely to negatively 
evaluate the target compared to the sources. Here, we predict that these moral evaluations will 
be associated with individuals’ behavior, so that observers who do not feel that the target has 
violated a social norm choose to side with the target and sanction the sources for their 
exclusionary behavior. In contrast, when observers know that a target has violated a social 
norm, observers are more likely to negatively evaluate and sanction the target compared to the 
sources in order to help protect the respective norm.  
We put these considerations to the test in four studies, which investigated how 
observers sanction the behavior of both targets and sources of ostracism. We define sanctions 
as both disadvantaging one or more persons when distributing a resource as well as actively 
punishing by subtracting a resource (here: money) from others. The reported studies have 
been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Psychology, University of 
Basel, and conform to recognized standards written in the Declaration of Helsinki. All 
OSTRACISM AND SANCTIONING 6
participants provided informed consent at the beginning of the study. Data was stored in the 
departmental repository and will be made available upon request to 
rainer.greifeneder@unibas.ch. 
 
Study 1 
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online via several online 
platforms and mailing lists and had the option to participate in a lottery for book vouchers. 
We calculated the sample size to detect medium-sized effects (f = .25, power = .80, required n 
= 128). One hundred and twenty-five participants finished the questionnaire, however, four 
persons indicated that their data should not be used for analysis. Thus, the final sample 
consisted of 121 participants (91 females, Mage = 25.69, SD = 8.20) who were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. 
norm-violating) factorial design. In addition, sanctions of target and sources were assessed as 
repeated measures. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were told that they should evaluate a social 
interaction sequence within a group. They were presented with a group of three psychology 
students (Karin, Leonie, and Sandra) who took a statistics exam. Because the names were 
randomized to agents, we refer to the students and their roles as A, B, and C in what follows. 
Students B and C were unhappy, because they had achieved the lowest possible grade. In 
order to keep the conditions as similar as possible, in both the norm-consistent as well as the 
norm-violating condition, Student A lied to B and C about her grade. However, in the norm-
consistent condition, Student A told a white lie (thus avoiding appearing superior to B and C) 
and claimed to have achieved the lowest possible grade as well, despite actually having 
achieved the highest possible grade. In the norm-violating condition, Student A is ostensibly 
lying to make herself appear better than B and C and claimed to have achieved the highest 
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possible grade, despite actually having achieved the lowest possible grade. In both conditions, 
Students B and C eventually find out about the lie. The story continued with the three students 
playing a ball game at a university sports event together. To illustrate the game, participants 
then watched a game of Cyberball from an observer’s perspective in which Student A was 
either included in the game or excluded, that is, Students B and C did not throw the ball to her 
after a short initial period (for more details about Cyberball, see Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 
2000).  
Next, participants were asked to imagine that the three persons had found money on 
the street independently from each other. Participants were asked to decide how much money 
each person should find (0 - 5 Swiss Francs [CHF] per person, in increments of CHF 1; note 
that what was allocated to one was not deducted from the others). As money distribution for 
the two sources was highly correlated (Spearman’s  = .94), values were averaged for the 
analysis. For exploratory reasons, participants were further asked how responsible each of the 
three persons was for the course of the story (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly); see online 
supplement for the results1. In addition, we assessed manipulation checks and control 
questions: Participants were asked to recall which grade each of the three students received. 
To measure whether the target’s behavior was indeed perceived as norm-consistent or norm-
violating, participants evaluated the fact that Student A was not telling the truth about her 
grade on three 7-point semantic differentials (unacceptable – acceptable, undesirable – 
desirable, morally wrong – morally good). Finally, the success of the ostracism manipulation 
was probed by means of the following questions: “How much did the three persons 
participate in the ball game?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and how much each of the three 
persons was excluded and ignored (7-point semantic differential, excluded – included, 
ignored – acknowledged). After providing demographic information, participants were 
thanked, debriefed, and offered participation in the lottery. 
Results 
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Manipulation checks. Eighty-six percent of participants correctly recalled each of the 
students’ grades.2 To test the successful manipulation of the target behavior, we ran a 2 
(ostracism: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 3 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating) 
mixed MANOVA on acceptability, moral goodness, and desirability of the lie. There was 
only a significant effect of the target behavior, Wilks’ λ = .804, F(3, 114) = 9.29, p < .001, η2 
= .20, while both the effect of ostracism and the interaction were non-significant, Wilks’ λ = 
.979, F(3, 114) = .82, p = .488, η2 = .02 and Wilks’ λ = .993, F(3, 114) = .27, p = .847, η2 = 
.01. Compared to the norm-violating lie, participants rated the norm-consistent (white) lie as 
more acceptable, F(1, 116) = 8.25, p = .005, η2 = .07 and morally good, , F(1, 116) = 18.94, p 
< .001, η2 = .14, though not as more desirable, F(1, 116) = 1.23, p = .269, η2 = .01.  
To test the successful manipulation of ostracism, we ran a 2 (person: target vs. 
sources) x 2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 3 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. 
norm-violating) mixed MANOVA with repeated measures on the person factor on 
perceptions of participation, exclusion, and inclusion. There were significant main effects of 
the person, Wilks’ λ = .317, F(3, 112) = 80.47, p < .001, η2 = .68, and ostracism, Wilks’ λ = 
.460, F(3, 112) = 12.60, p < .001, η2 = .25, that were qualified by a person x ostracism 
interaction, Wilks’ λ = .386, F(3, 112) = 59.29, p < .001, η2 = .61. Neither the main effect of 
the target behavior nor any of the interactions with target behavior were significant, largest F: 
Wilks’ λ = .972, F(3, 112) = 1.06, p = .368, η2 = .03. Breaking the interaction down by simple 
effects, compared to the inclusion condition, in the exclusion condition participants indicated 
that the target participated less, F(1, 114) = 117.26, p < .001, η2 = .51, was more excluded, 
F(1, 114) = 146.43, p < .001, η2 = .56, and ignored, F(1, 114) = 65.80, p < .001, η2 = .37. In 
contrast, participants felt that compared to the inclusion group, excluding sources participated 
more, F(1, 114) = 54.04, p < .001, η2 = .32, were less excluded, F(1, 114) = 18.40, p < .001, 
η2 = .14,  and less ignored, F(1, 114) = 19.41, p < .001, η2 = .15. See Table 1 for the 
descriptive statistics.   
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Dependent variables. We ran a 2 (person: target vs. sources) x 2 (ostracism: 
exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the person factor on the distributed amount of money. 
None of the main effects were significant (person: F(1, 117) = 1.24, p = .269, η2 =.01; 
ostracism: F(1, 117) = 1.67, p = .199, η2 =.01; target behavior: F(1, 117) = 0.90, p = .344, η2 
=.01). The person x ostracism and the ostracism x target behavior interactions were also not 
significant, F(1, 117) = 0.45, p = .506, η2 =.00 and F(1, 117) = 0.38, p = .537, η2 =.00.  
However, the analysis revealed a significant person x target behavior two-way interaction, 
F(1, 117) = 21.39, p < .001, η2 =.16, which was qualified by the hypothesized person x 
ostracism x target behavior three-way interaction, F(1, 117) = 6.22, p = .014, η2 =.05.  
To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the two 
target behavior conditions: When the target violated the social norm, there was only a main 
effect of the person, showing that the target was sanctioned more than the sources, F(1, 55) = 
15.75, p < .001, η2 =.22. Ostracism and the interaction had no significant effects, F(1, 55) = 
0.21, p = .650, η2 =.00, and  F(1, 55) = 1.60, p = .211, η2 =.03 However, when the target acted 
consistently with the social norm, there was a significant effect of the person, F(1, 62) = 6.48, 
p = .013, η2 =.10, that was qualified by the person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 62) = 
5.24, p = .025, η2 =.08. There was no main effect of ostracism, F(1, 62) = 1.99, p = .163, η2 
=.03. Breaking down the interaction via simple main effects, we found that when the sources 
excluded the target, they were sanctioned more than the target, F(1, 62) = 12.47, p < .001, η2 
= .17. There was no significant effect in the inclusion condition, F(1, 62) = 0.03, p = .862, η2 
= .00. See Figure 1 and Table 1 for the descriptive statistics. 
Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, participants sanctioned ostracism of a target without a 
proper reason by allocating less money to the sources. However, when the target had 
previously violated a social norm, observers sanctioned the target’s behavior instead.  
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One caveat of the study is that perceived norm-consistency was likely only relative 
between conditions, as descriptively, in all conditions Student A’s behavior was rated below 
the scale midpoint of 4 on acceptability, moral goodness, and desirability of the lie. Perhaps 
participants perceived lying as always being wrong, no matter whether it was a white lie or 
not. We address this potential limitation in Study 2. 
Study 2 
Because investigating behaviors that are perceived as norm-consistent or violating 
social norms is central to our hypothesis, in Study 2, we chose a scenario in which the target 
acted fully appropriately in the norm-consistent condition. Moreover, we split the norm-
violating condition into a “weak norm-violation” and a “strong norm-violation,” to investigate 
differences in the appropriateness of exclusion as a punishment. Finally, we exchanged the 
inclusion group with a control group that received no information about the sources’ actions.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online via several online 
platforms and mailing lists and had the option to participate in a lottery for book coupons. We 
calculated the sample size so as to detect medium-sized effects (f = .25, power = .80, required 
n = 158). One hundred and seventy-two participants finished the questionnaire. However, 
three persons indicated that their data should not be used for analysis. Thus, the final sample 
consisted of 169 participants (126 females, Mage = 25.64, SD = 8.05) who were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. control) x 3 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. 
weakly norm-violating vs. strongly norm-violating) factorial design. Sanctions of target and 
sources were assessed as repeated measures. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were told that they should evaluate a social 
interaction. They were presented with a story about a group of three female students (Karin, 
Leonie, and Sandra) who were friends attending a party together. As in Study 1, the names 
were randomized to agents, and we refer to the students and their roles as A, B, and C in what 
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follows. Student B brought her new boyfriend with her to the party, and this boyfriend later 
starts to flirt with Student A. We manipulated Student A’s reaction: In the norm-consistent 
condition, Student A ended the conversation with the boyfriend immediately when he started 
flirting, and walked away. In the weak norm-violation-condition, she flirted back at first, but 
ended the conversation when he got too close. In the strong norm-violating condition, she 
started kissing Student B’s boyfriend. In all three conditions, Students B and C noticed what 
was going on. The three descriptions of the target’s behavior were pre-tested with 75 
participants via the mailing list of the online psychology Platform www.forschung-erleben.de 
(53 females, Mage = 27.39, SD = 6.36). Note that in the pre-test, three versions of the weak 
norm-violation description were tested, but here we only report the results of the version that 
was also used in the main study. Pretest-participants evaluated Student A’s behavior on four 
7-point semantic differentials (unacceptable – acceptable, undesirable – desirable, morally 
wrong – morally good, incorrect - correct), that were aggregated to one moral judgement 
score, Cronbach’s α = .94. An ANOVA of target behavior on moral judgement showed 
significant differences between the conditions, F(2, 41) = 20.34, p < .001, η2 = .50. The norm-
consistent target behavior was rated as morally superior to the weak violation (M = 6.08, SD 
= 1.58 vs. M = 4.55, SD = 1.59), t(28) = 2.65, p = .013, d = 0.97, and both the norm-
consistent behavior and the weak violation were rated as morally superior to the strong norm-
violation (M = 2.70, SD = .92), t(26) = 6.94, p < .001, d = 2.62 and t(28) = 3.83, p = .001, d = 
1.40. The strong norm-violation and the norm-consistent behavior were both rated as 
significantly different from the scale-midpoint in the respective directions, t(13) = -5.30, p < 
.001, d = 1.41 and t(13) = 4.94, p < .001, d = 1.31. 
As in Study 1, in the Exclusion condition, the story continued with the three students 
playing a ball game at a university sports event together the next day. Participants then 
watched a game of Cyberball in which Student A was excluded from the game. In the Control 
condition, there was no ball game and participants directly answered the dependent variables. 
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The dependent variable was the same as in Study 1 (money found on the street; 0 - 5 Swiss 
Francs [CHF], in increments of 1 CHF). Values for the two sources were averaged 
(Spearman’s  = .93).  As in Study 1, participants were also asked about the level of 
responsibility each of the three students had over the course of the events; see online 
supplement. Participants also evaluated the morality of Student A’s behavior on the same 
items as in the pretest, Cronbach’s α = .92. The morality of the boyfriend’s behavior was also 
assessed for exploratory reasons unrelated to the present research question, thus, no respective 
analyses are reported. Participants were further asked to identify the name of Student A, who 
was being flirted with, and the name of Student B, who brought her boyfriend to the party. In 
addition, participants in the exclusion condition evaluated the students’ participation in the 
Cyberball game and how much each of the students was excluded and ignored (see Study 1). 
After providing demographic information, participants were thanked, debriefed, and could 
participate in the lottery. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Ninety-one percent of participants correctly recalled the names 
of Students A and B.  The target’s behavior significantly affected participants’ moral 
judgment, F(2, 162) = 42.84, p < .001, η2 =.35. Neither ostracism nor the interaction had an 
effect, F(1, 162) = 0.09, p = .769, η2 =.00 and F(2, 162) = 0.62, p = .538, η2 =.01. Compared 
to the norm-consistent behavior, both the weak and the strong norm-violation were rated as 
more morally wrong, t(1,162) = 7.64,  p < .001, d = 1.20 and t(1,162) = 8.42, p < .001, d = 
1.32; however, there was no significant difference between the weak and the strong norm-
violation, t(1,162) = 0.67, p = .503, d = 0.11. 
As the ostracism manipulation check was only presented to participants in the 
ostracism but not in the control condition, the control and the ostracism condition cannot be 
compared. As an equivalent, we thus compared the targets and the sources. A 2 x (person: 
target vs. sources) x 3 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. weak norm-violation vs. strong 
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norm-violation) MANOVA with repeated measures on the person factor on participation, 
exclusion, and ignoring showed only an effect of the person, Wilks’ λ = .066, F(3, 66) = 
310.86, p < .001, η2 = .68, there was no effect of target behavior, Wilks’ λ = .963, F(6, 132) = 
0.418, p =.868, η2 = .02, or an interaction, Wilks’ λ = .896, F(6, 132) = 1.24, p = .291, η2 = 
.05. Participants in the exclusion condition indicated that the target participated less than the 
sources, F(1,68) = 899.57, p < .001, η2 = .93, was more excluded, F(1,68) = 807.56, p < .001, 
η2 = .92, and ignored, F(1,68) = 504.56, p < .001, η2 = .88. See Table 2 for the descriptive 
statistics. 
Dependent variables. We ran a 2 x (person: target vs. sources) 2 (ostracism: 
exclusion vs. control) x 3 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. weak norm-violation vs. 
strong norm-violation) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the person factor on the 
amount of money that participants distributed. The analysis revealed main effects for 
ostracism, F(1, 161) = 4.48, p = .036, η2 =.03, and for the target behavior, F(2, 161) = 3.92, p 
= .022, η2 =.05, which were both qualified by a significant person x target behavior two-way 
interaction, F(2, 161) = 14.96, p < .001, η2 =.16, a significant person x ostracism two-way 
interaction, F(1, 161) = 14.54, p < .001, η2 =.08, and a significant target behavior x ostracism 
two-way interaction, F(2, 161) = 6.25, p = .002, η2 =.07. The main effect of the person and 
the three-way interaction were not significant, F(1, 161) = 1.20, p = .370, η2 =.01 and F(2, 
161) = 1.20, p = .304, η2 =.02. 
Although the three-way interaction was not significant, we offer an independent 
analysis of the results separately for target behavior condition so as to ensure comparability 
with the results’ sections of the other studies: As in Study 1, when the target violated the 
social norm, there was only a main effect of the person, showing that the target was 
sanctioned more than the sources, F(1, 56) = 18.02, p < .001, η2 =.24. Neither the effect of 
ostracism nor the interaction was significant, F(1, 56) = 1.99, p = .164, η2 =.03 and F(1, 56) = 
1.15, p = .288, η2 =.02. 
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When the target committed a weak norm violation, there was a significant effect of 
ostracism, F(1, 52) = 4.58, p = .037, η2 =.08, that was qualified by the significant person x 
ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 52) = 4.59, p = .037, η2 =.08. The main effect of the 
person was not significant, F(1, 52) = 0.05, p = .831, η2 =.00. Breaking down the interaction 
via simple main effects, we found that targets and sources were not treated differently in the 
exclusion group, F(1, 52) = 1.62, p = .209, η2 = .03. In the control group, however, there was 
a non-significant trend that the target was sanctioned more than the sources, F(1, 52) = 3.26 p 
= .077, η2 = .06. 
When the target acted consistently with the social norm, there was a significant effect 
of the person, F(1, 53) = 11.89, p = .001, η2 =.18, and of ostracism, F(1, 53) = 10.56, p = 
.002, η2 =.17, that was qualified by the  person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 53) = 
13.12, p = .001, η2 =.20. Breaking down the interaction via simple main effects, we found that 
when the sources excluded the target, they were sanctioned more than the target, F(1,53) = 
20.83, p < .001, η2 = .28. In the control group, targets and sources were not treated differently, 
F(1,53) = 0.02, p = .891, η2 = .00. See Figure 2 and Table 2 for the descriptive statistics. 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1: Participants assigned less money to the 
sources for excluding a norm-consistent target, but when the target had violated social norms, 
participants sanctioned the target’s behavior instead. Interestingly, observers’ moral 
judgement was more extreme than the sanctioning behavior they ultimately displayed: While 
participants perceived both the weak and the strong norm-violating behavior of the target as 
morally wrong, they only accepted the target’s exclusion and assigned less money to her than 
to the sources when she had committed a strong but not a weak norm-violation.  
Study 3 
 Studies 1 and 2 relied on scenarios, such that participants knew that they were not 
actually assigning money to others. While money allocation is an often-used variable to 
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measure punishment in ostracism contexts (Güroğlu et al., 2013; Over & Uskul, 2016; Will et 
al., 2013), one could argue that fictional money distribution is not a fitting sanction for the 
norm violations in Studies 1 and 2. Moreover, as the money distribution was fictional, it 
might rather measure participants’ judgment of deservingness, which may or may not 
translate into participants actively aiming to restore justice by punishing the sources or the 
target. To investigate this question, Study 3 was designed in such a way that participants 
assumed they were actually punishing a third person and provided a better fit between the 
norm violation and the punishment. In addition, we tested the assumption that the effect of 
norm-conformity and ostracism on the sanctioning of targets and sources is mediated via the 
evaluation of targets and sources.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via Prolific Academic (US 
Americans only) for a payment of £1. We calculated the minimal sample size to detect 
medium-sized effects (f = .25, power = .90, required n = 171). One hundred and ninety-nine 
participants finished the questionnaire (100 females, 1 person who did not assign a gender 
category), Mage = 31.79, SD = 11.41) and were randomly assigned to a 2 (ostracism: exclusion 
vs. inclusion) x 2 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating) factorial design. 
Punishment of target and sources was assessed as repeated measures. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were told that they should evaluate a social 
interaction. They were presented with material from an alleged previous study in which 
participants (henceforth called “players”) had to work together as a team on several tasks. In 
that study, the alleged players had played a cooperation game called “the fishpond,” a 
dilemma of the commons (Spada & Opwis, 1985), in which players can draw fish from a 
common pond over three rounds. In the norm-consistent condition, all players chose to play 
cooperatively, by taking only one fish in the first two rounds. Thus, the fish population could 
recover and everyone ended up with four fish at the end of round three. In the norm-violating 
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condition, the target acted greedily and took the maximum amount of fish (two) out of the 
pond each round. S/he ended up with six fish while the other two players only received two 
fish each. After the fishpond game, the players allegedly worked together on a follow-up task. 
For this task, they could decide whether they would like to work with both participants or 
decline to work with one or even both of the others. In the exclusion condition, the two 
sources both declined to work with the target; in the inclusion condition, every player chose to 
work with both co-players. 
After observing the interaction within the alleged study, the actual participants were 
told that each of the players would receive a £1 bonus payment for each fish that s/he caught 
during the fishpond game. Participants were further told that they had the possibility to reduce 
the bonus payments that the three players would receive. The final bonus payment received 
by the game players would allegedly be determined by the number of fish the players had 
caught minus the average penalty given by the other participants. 
As ratings of the two sources were highly correlated (Spearman’s  = .95 - .98), 
ratings were averaged for the dependent variable and the mediator. To assess punishment, 
participants had the option to subtract money up to a maximum of £2 in increments of £0.25 
from each player’s bonus. Moreover, to assess how participants evaluated the players, we 
asked participants three items per player measuring their cognitive and emotional responses 
towards the other players. Specifically, we asked how much they would like to work together 
on a cooperative task with each of the players (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and how they 
felt about the other persons and their behavior: “I feel angry about the behavior of [Player’s 
Name]” and “I can sympathize with [Player’s Name]” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), for all 
scales, see Rudert and colleagues (2018). An exploratory factor analysis extracted one factor 
that explains 77% of the variance for the target and 72% for the sources; all factor loadings 
were > .80. The three evaluation measures were thus aggregated in a composite evaluation 
score (Target: α = .85; Sources: α = .80).  
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We further assessed ascribed responsibility (see online supplement for both the item 
descriptions and results). As a manipulation check, participants were asked which player(s) 
had the most fish at the end of the fishpond game and which player would have to work alone 
in the subsequent group task. We further asked how realistic the situation was; for item 
descriptions and results, see online supplement.  Moreover, we added several attention checks 
throughout the study and informed participants upfront about their occurrence, which was 
meant to ensure that participants paid attention. These variables were not analyzed.  
Results 
Manipulation checks. 95% of all participants correctly answered which player caught 
the most fish and 94% correctly recalled which player had to work alone in the group task. In 
total, 90% of the participants answered both manipulation checks correctly.  
Dependent variables. Punishment. We ran a 2 (person: target vs. sources) x 
2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-
violating) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the person factor on the amount of 
money that participants subtracted. The analysis revealed an effect for the person, F(1, 195) = 
79.30, p < .001, η2 =.29 and for the target behavior, F(1, 195) = 37.81, p < .001, η2 =.16, 
which were both qualified by a person x target behavior two-way interaction, F(1, 195) = 
118.61, p < .001, η2 =.38, and a person x ostracism x target behavior three-way interaction, 
F(1, 195) = 4.85, p = .029, η2 =.02. Neither the effect of ostracism, F(1, 195) = 0.94, p = 
.333, η2 =.01, nor the two-way interactions of ostracism x person and ostracism x conformity 
were significant, F(1, 195) = 0.01, p = .946, η2 =.00 and F(1, 195) = 0.02, p = .900, η2 =.00. 
See Figure 3 and Table 3 for the descriptive statistics. 
To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the target 
behavior conditions: When the target violated the social norm, there was only a main effect of 
the person, showing that the target was sanctioned more than the sources, F(1, 100) = 122.05, 
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p < .001, η2 =.55. Ostracism and the interaction had no significant effects, F(1, 100) = 0.57, p 
= .453, η2 =.01 and F(1, 100) = 1.60, p = .208, η2 =.02.  
When the target acted in line with the social norm, ostracism had no significant main 
effect, F(1, 95) = 0.38, p = .538, η2 =.00, but there was a significant main effect of the person, 
F(1, 95) = 6.06, p = .016, η2 =.06, that was qualified by a significant person x ostracism two-
way interaction, F(1, 95) = 7.00, p = .010, η2 =.07. Looking at the simple main effects, we 
found that when the sources excluded the target, they were sanctioned more than the target, 
F(1, 95) = 13.75, p < .001, η2 = .13. There was no significant difference between target and 
sources in the inclusion group, F(1, 95) = 0.02, p = .899, η2 = .00. 
Evaluation. An ANOVA on evaluation revealed a significant main effect for all 
independent variables (person: F(1, 195) = 43.77, p < .001, η2 =.18, ostracism: F(1, 195) = 
20.72, p < .001, η2 =.10, target behavior: F(1, 195) = 46.20, p < .001, η2 =.19) as well as two 
two-way interactions (person x target behavior: F(1, 195) = 194.40, p < .001, η2 =.50, 
ostracism x target behavior: F(1, 195) = 8.85, p = .003, η2 =.04, that were qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 195) = 27.46, p < .001, η2 =.12. The person x ostracism 
interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 195) = 3.62, p = .059, η2 =.02, 
Similar to participants’ punishment behavior, when the target had violated the social 
norm, there was a main effect of the person insofar that participants evaluated the target 
worse, F(1, 100) = 151.52, p < .001, η2 =.60. The main effect of ostracism was not 
significant, F(1, 100) = 1.84, p = .178, η2 =.02, but there was a significant interaction, F(1, 
100) = 3.99, p = .048, η2 =.04. Looking at the simple main effects, the target was evaluated 
worse than the sources when s/he was both included or excluded, but the effect sizes indicate 
that the effect was larger in the exclusion compared to the inclusion group, F(1, 100) = 
100.39, p < .001, η2 =.50 and F(1, 100) = 54.22, p < .001, η2 =.35. 
When the target had acted norm-consistently, there were significant main effects of the 
person, F(1, 95) = 48.00, p < .001, η2 =.34 and of ostracism, F(1, 95) = 20.89, p < .001, η2 
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=.18, that were qualified by a significant person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 95) = 
18.05, p < .001, η2 =.32. Looking at the simple main effects, we found that when the sources 
excluded the target, participants evaluated the sources worse than the target, F(1, 95) = 98.68, 
p < .001, η2 = .51. When the sources included the target, evaluation of the target and the 
sources did not differ, F(1, 95) = 0.01, p = .905, η2 = .00. 
Mediation analyses. We ran two mediation models with the SPSS PROCESS macro 
(Hayes, 2013), using 5,000 bootstrap estimates: (a) a mediation model for the effect of 
conformity on punishment of the target via evaluation of the target and (b) a mediated 
moderation model for the effect of the ostracism x conformity interaction on punishment of 
the sources via evaluation of the sources. 
 As for model (a), there was a significant indirect effect of conformity on punishment 
of the target via evaluation of the target, bindirect = 2.62, 95% CI [1.83; 2.46]. If the target 
violated the social norm, s/he was evaluated more negatively and this was associated with 
more money being subtracted from his/her bonus.  
As for model (b), the effect of the ostracism x conformity interaction on punishment of 
the sources was significantly mediated via evaluation of the sources, bindirect = -1.07, 95% CI = 
[-2.07; -.36].  If the sources excluded compared to included a norm-consistent target, the 
sources were evaluated more negatively and this was associated with more money being 
subtracted from their bonus, bindirect = .93, 95% CI = [.29; 1.79]. If the target had violated the 
social norm, the indirect effect was not significant, bindirect = -.14, 95% CI [-.45; .03]. 
Discussion 
Study 3 replicates and further extends the findings of Studies 1 and 2: When the target 
had violated social norms before, observers punished the target. When the target had acted 
norm-consistently but was excluded by the sources, participants punished the sources. These 
effects were mediated via the evaluation of the target and the sources, respectively, suggesting 
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that observers dislike norm violations (violations of the norm of cooperation or inclusion) and 
consequently devalue as well as punish the respective perpetrators.  
Study 4 
Study 4 was similar to Study 3 and served to address open alternative explanations. 
First, in Study 3 it might have been unclear whether the effects were due to norms being 
violated or due to the target committing some sort of interpersonal transgression against the 
sources. Indeed, one could argue that taking more fish, knowing that the others will then 
receive less, could be perceived as an interpersonal transgression. To investigate this potential 
confound, we did two things: we ran a pre-test showing that there is a general injunctive norm 
to behave cooperatively within the Fishpond Game (that is, individuals believe that one 
should play cooperatively within the game). In addition, we changed the game in Study 4 so 
that in none of the conditions did the sources suffer a direct disadvantage from the target’s 
behavior.  
Second, another potential concern might have been that the game was not very 
consequential for the observers. Specifically, in Study 3, the observing participants could 
make a decision about punishment without having to bother about downstream consequences 
for themselves. Yet in real life, observers may need to be careful if they decide to punish 
someone, because if this course of action itself violates social norms, others may disagree and 
observers might easily become the target of repercussions themselves. To simulate such a 
consequential situation, Study 4’s participants were incentivized to act in line with what 
others perceive as acceptable. Specifically, participants were told that they would receive a 
higher bonus payment if they acted in line with the average penalties that other participants in 
the same social situation had assigned.  
Third, in Study 3 we focused on the mediating role of evaluations, yet one may argue 
that perceptions of fairness play an important role, too. Potential evidence stems from 
research on third-party punishment showing that defection in cooperative games elicits 
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negative fairness judgements as well as punishment behavior in observers (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004). Moreover, fairness considerations play an important role in models of 
observer’s reactions to workplace injustice (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015). Thus, in 
Study 4 we additionally test both the role of evaluations as well as perceptions of fairness as 
potential mediators of the effect of target behavior and ostracism on sanctioning by the 
observers.  
We originally predicted and pre-registered a serial mediation model, assuming that 
that target’s behavior would affect observer’s fairness considerations, which would then affect 
evaluations of targets and sources, and ultimately participants’ punishing behavior. However, 
during the review process, the Editor asked us to perform a simultaneous mediation analysis 
instead, given that the study design does not allow for causal conclusions regarding the 
mediation. The model reported in what follows thus predicts that participants judge the 
behavior of a norm-violating target (compared to a norm-consistently acting target) as unfair 
and evaluate the target negatively, which should be associated with  greater punishment of the 
target. However, when the target behaves in a norm-consistent manner and the sources 
exclude her/him nonetheless, the model predicts that observers perceive the sources’ behavior 
as unfair and evaluate the sources negatively, which should be associated with stronger 
punishment of the sources. For results of the serial mediation model, see online supplement. 
Pretest  
For the pretest, we recruited 81 participants (37 females, Mage = 34.94, SD = 11.12) via 
Prolific Academic for a payment of £0.50. They were presented with the rules of the Fishpond 
game (without observing the game being played) and were then randomly assigned to two 
norm conditions. Participants in the injunctive norm condition were asked what other 
individuals would generally expect to be the right thing to do when playing the Fishpond 
game. Participants in the descriptive norm condition were asked what individuals would 
generally do when playing the Fishpond game. The response options were the same for both 
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groups (take zero/one/more than one fish per round). Results show that in the injunctive norm 
condition, 75% of the participants replied that each player should take one fish per round, and 
25% replied that they should take more than one, 2(1, n = 40) = 10, p = .002. In the 
descriptive norm condition, 58% of the participants replied that each player would take more 
than one fish per round and 42% replied that they would take only one, 2(1, n = 40) = 0.90, 
p = .343. Thus, while participants were not necessarily convinced that others would in fact 
play cooperatively (a pessimistic descriptive social norm), there was a clear injunctive norm 
that they should do so.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via Prolific Academic (US-Americans 
only) for a payment of £0.90 plus a variable bonus of up to 30p. Since the effect size of the 
three-way interaction in Study 3 was small, following Cohen’s conventions we calculated the 
sample size based on an effect size of f = .14, aiming for a power = .80. G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) calculates a required sample of 400. To account for 
possible data exclusions, we chose to oversample by 5% and collected data of 420 
participants. The study was pre-registered on AsPredicted (https://aspredicted.org/4jt9s.pdf). 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. inclusion) x 2 (target 
behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating) factorial design. Punishment of target and 
sources was assessed as repeated measures. In total, 425 participants finished the 
questionnaire, however, seven persons indicated that their data should not be used, so that the 
final sample consisted of 418 persons (207 females, 1 person who did not assign a gender 
category), Mage = 33.85, SD = 12.15).  
Materials and procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 3, with the 
following changes: (1) In Study 4, the sources had not played the fishpond game with the 
target. Instead, participants watched the target playing the fishpond game with two persons, 
and then being assigned to a different group. Within that new group, all players could see how 
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many fish the respective others had caught in the previous fishpond game. By means of this 
procedure, the sources knew whether the target had violated the social norm, but had not 
incurred a personal disadvantage from a target behaving uncooperatively. (2) Participants 
could win a bonus of a maximum of 30p after the study. This bonus was linearly decreased 
the more participants’ decisions deviated from what can be expected as the descriptive norm 
in this situation (we used the decisions from participants in Study 3 as the descriptive norm). 
This payout-structure was implemented to make the study more consequential for 
participants, mirroring the social dilemma that observers often find themselves in when 
considering whether to intervene: If observers’ decisions regarding punishment are not 
considered acceptable by others, observers might suffer from negative (social) consequences. 
(3) We included the evaluation measures used in Study 3 (interest in cooperation, anger, and 
sympathy with each of the players) and aggregated them in a composite evaluation score 
(Target: α = .86; Sources: α = .78). In addition, we included a measure of fairness to test its 
role as an additional mediator. Specifically, participants were asked, “How fairly did the 
different players act throughout the study” and rated each player on a 7-point scale (1= very 
unfair; 7 = very fair). As ratings of the two sources were highly correlated (Spearman’s  = 
.95 - .98), ratings were averaged for the dependent variable and both mediators. 
Responsibility was not assessed in Study 4. We added another open-format 
manipulation check asking about the maximum amount of fish that individuals who acted 
cooperatively could catch during the Fishpond game. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. 85% of all participants correctly answered which player caught 
the most fish and 90% correctly recalled which player had to work alone in the group task. In 
total, 79% of the participants answered both checks correctly. The majority of participants (81 
%) also correctly stated that a cooperative player would end up with a maximum of four fish 
in the end.  
OSTRACISM AND SANCTIONING 24
Dependent variables.  
Punishment. We ran a 2 (person: target vs. sources) x 2 (ostracism: exclusion vs. 
inclusion) x 2 (target behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the person factor on the amount of money that participants subtracted. 
The analysis revealed no significant main effect of ostracism, F(1, 414) = 3.77, p = .053, η2 
=.01. However, there was a significant main effect for the person, F(1, 414) = 212.26, p < 
.001, η2 =.34 and for the target behavior, F(1, 414) = 121.39, p < .001, η2 =.23, which were 
both qualified by a person x target behavior two-way interaction, F(1, 414) = 356.16, p < 
.001, η2 =.46, and the hypothesized person x ostracism x target behavior three-way 
interaction, F(1, 414) = 13.47, p < .001, η2 =.03. The ostracism x person and the ostracism x 
target behavior interaction were both not significant, F(1, 414) = 1.78, p = .183, η2 =.00, F(1, 
414) = 1.78, p = .183, η2 =.00 and F(1, 414) = 2.75, p = .098, η2 =.01. See Figure 4 and Table 
4 for the descriptive statistics. 
To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the target 
behavior conditions3: When the target violated the social norm, there was only a main effect 
of the person, showing that the target was sanctioned more than the sources, F(1, 207) = 
345.78, p < .001, η2 =.63. Ostracism and the person x ostracism interaction were not 
significant, F(1, 207) = 0.04, p = .849, η2 =.00 and F(1, 207) = 1.69, p =.196, η2 =.01. When 
the target acted in line with the social norm, there was a significant effect of the person, F(1, 
207) = 24.16, p < .001, η2 =.10, and of ostracism, F(1, 207) = 7.25, p = .008, η2 =.03, that 
were qualified by a significant person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 207) = 32.68, p < 
.001, η2 =.14. Looking at the simple main effects, we found that when the sources excluded 
the target, they were sanctioned more than the target, F(1, 207) = 56.25, p < .001, η2 =.21. 
When the sources included the target, there was no significant difference between sources and 
target, F(1, 207) = 0.324, p = .570, η2 =.00. 
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Evaluation. An ANOVA on evaluation revealed a significant main effect for all 
independent variables (person: F(1, 414) = 128.17, p < .001, η2 =.24, ostracism: F(1, 414) = 
33.07, p < .001, η2 =.07, target behavior: F(1, 414) = 266.26, p < .001, η2 =.39), as well as 
three two-way interactions (person x ostracism: F(1, 414) = 12.00, p = .001, η2 =.03, person x 
target behavior: F(1, 414) = 594.27, p < .001, η2 =.59, ostracism x target behavior: F(1, 414) 
= 64.76, p < .001, η2 =.14), that were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 
414) = 72.69, p < .001, η2 =.15.   
To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the target 
behavior conditions: When the target violated the social norm, there was a main effect of the 
person, F(1, 207) = 477.44, p < .001, η2 =.70. The effect of ostracism was not significant F(1, 
207) = 2.80, p = .096, η2 =.01, but there was a significant person x ostracism interaction, F(1, 
207) = 9.60, p = .002, η2 =.04. Looking at the simple main effects, in both the inclusion and 
the exclusion condition, the target was generally evaluated worse than the sources. When 
comparing the effect sizes, the effect was stronger in the exclusion condition, F(1, 207) = 
318.85, p < .001, η2 =.61 than in the inclusion condition, F(1, 207) = 171.72, p < .001, η2 
=.45. 
When the target acted in line with the social norm, there was a significant effect of the 
person, F(1, 207) = 128.07, p < .001, η2 =.38,  and of ostracism, F(1, 207) = 89.85, p < .001, 
η2 =.30,  that were qualified by a significant person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 
207) = 107.99, p < .001, η2 =.34. Looking at the simple main effects, we found that when the 
sources excluded the target, participants evaluated them worse compared to the target, F(1, 
207) = 234.51, p < .001, η2 =. 53. There was no significant difference in the evaluation of 
target and sources following inclusion, F(1, 207) = 0.43, p = .513, η2 =. 00. 
Fairness. An ANOVA on fairness revealed a significant main effect for all 
independent variables (person: F(1, 414) = 192.15, p < .001, η2 =. 32, ostracism: F(1, 414) = 
59.79, p < .001, η2 =. 13, target behavior: F(1, 414) = 392.03, p < .001, η2 =. 49), as well as 
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three two-way interactions (person x ostracism: F(1, 414) = 10.47, p = .001, η2 =. 03; person 
x target behavior: F(1, 414) = 616.19, p < .001, η2 =. 60, ostracism x target behavior: F(1, 
414) = 38.87, p < .001, η2 =. 09), that were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 414) = 61.31, p < .001, η2 =.13. 
To break down the three-way interaction, we ran the analysis separately for the target 
behavior conditions: When the target violated the social norm, there was no significant effect 
of ostracism, F(1, 207) = 1.25, p = .264, η2 =.01, however, there was a significant effect of the 
person, F(1, 207) = 533.09, p < .001, η2 =.72, as well as a person x ostracism interaction, F(1, 
207) = 7.52, p = .007, η2 =.03. Looking at the simple main effects, the target was always rated 
less fair than the sources. Comparing the effect sizes, however, the effect was stronger when 
s/he had been excluded, F(1, 207) = 341.79, p < .001, η2 =.62, compared to included, F(1, 
207) = 202.16, p < .001, η2 =.50.  
When the target acted in line with the social norm, there was a significant main effect 
of the person, F(1, 207) = 100.70, p < .001, η2 =. 33 and ostracism, F(1, 207) = 88.32, p < 
.001, η2 =. 30, that was qualified by a significant person x ostracism two-way interaction, F(1, 
207) = 102.63, p < .001, η2 =.33. When the sources excluded the target, they were rated as 
less fair than the target, F(1, 207) = 202.35, p < .001, η2 =.50.  When the sources included the 
target, there was no significant difference in the perception of targets and sources, F(1, 207) = 
0.01, p = .946, η2 =.00. 
Mediation analyses. We ran two mediation models with MPLUS (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2015), using 5,000 bootstrap estimates: (a) a mediation model for the effect of 
conformity on punishment of the target via fairness and evaluation of the target and (b) a 
mediated moderation model for the effect of the ostracism x conformity interaction on 
punishment of the sources via fairness and evaluation of the sources. As for model (a) there 
was a significant indirect effect of conformity on punishment of the target via evaluation of 
the target, bindirect = 1.50, 90% CI = [1.01; 1.97], but not via fairness, bindirect = 0.19, 90% CI = 
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[-0.31; 0.73]. In contrast, in model (b), the indirect effect of the ostracism x conformity 
interaction on punishment of the sources via evaluation was not significant, bindirect = -0.19, 
90% CI = [-0.41; 0.02]. However, there was an indirect effect of the interaction on 
punishment via fairness, bindirect = -0.28, 90% CI = [-0.45; -0.11].  
Discussion 
Study 4 replicated the findings of Study 3 and extended them in at least three 
important respects. First, the results suggest that the violation of social norms by either the 
target or sources drives the effects on punishment. This conclusion receives further support by 
the fact that the effect replicated even though the target behavior could not be perceived as an 
interpersonal transgression against the sources, thus refuting a potential alternative account of 
Study 3. In particular, participants perceived the game’s injunctive social norm as being 
cooperative, and agreed with the sources excluding an uncooperative target even if the target 
had not harmed the sources personally. These findings are largely in line with findings on 
third-party punishment, which hold that individuals punish uncooperative others even if they 
are not personally put at a disadvantage (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Second, by incentivizing 
participants to make punishment decisions in line with the descriptive social norm, we made 
sure that observers did not merely punish because they could do so without consequences, but 
that they also took into account how others might react to their decisions. Finally, we 
explored the role of potential mediators. We found that when the target violated social norms, 
evaluations seem to be of relevance when making a decision about punishing a norm-
violating target. On the other hand, fairness considerations seem to be the more important 
factor associated with punishing the sources. Although both variables (fairness and 
evaluation) are highly inter-correlated and the design does not allow for causal conclusions, 
we offer the cautious speculation that individuals who violate social norms mainly get 
punished because they are evaluated negatively, while sources are punished when they 
ostracize a target for no good reason because this act is seen as unfair. Independent of this 
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speculation, the present findings extend the literature by showing that reactions towards 
targets versus sources are associated with different concerns (negative evaluations of targets; 
perceptions of unfairness for sources). 
Our suggested theoretical model, which assumes that judgments of fairness as well as 
evaluations of the target and sources affect participants’ sanctioning behavior, is purely 
theoretically driven. However, as the mediators and the dependent variables were measured at 
the same time, a different model would also be conceivable, such as sanctioning decisions 
affecting evaluations. Still, the here proposed mediational chain is consistent with prior 
research that established a direct link between the ostracism situation and moral judgments 
(Rudert et al., 2018). In a similar fashion, we also assumed that especially in situations in 
which participants have no additional information or opinion about the persons they are about 
to evaluate, it is more likely that attributions and judgments about fairness precede 
evaluations than vice versa (see also Arpin, Froehlich, Lantian, Rudert, & Stelter, 2017; 
Chatman & Von Hippel, 2001, for a similar argument). 
General Discussion 
Observers’ reactions to ostracism are not one-sided, but differ depending on the 
respective social norms: If the target has violated a social norm before, observers sanction the 
target’s behavior. In contrast, if the sources ostracize a target without an apparent socially 
acceptable reason, observers sanction the sources’ behavior by assigning them less money 
(Studies 1 and 2) or taking money away (Studies 3 and 4). These effects were mediated via 
negative evaluations and fairness judgments (Studies 3 and 4). Results suggest that evaluation 
criteria such as participants’ anger, sympathy, and willingness to cooperate seem to be more 
important for the punishment of the target, while fairness considerations seem to be more 
strongly associated with punishment of the sources (Study 4).  
Results suggest that target sanctioning occurred independently of whether the sources 
ostracized the target or not. Still, in Studies 3 and 4, excluded norm-violating targets were 
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evaluated particularly negatively and the targets were perceived as highly unfair compared to 
the sources. The observed difference in evaluation was less extreme in the inclusion group 
(Study 4). Presumably, observers might perceive inclusion after norm-violation as a signal 
that the norm violation has been forgiven by the sources, thus resulting in a less negative 
evaluation of the target. Reversely, exclusion might be taken as a signal that ostracism as a 
corrective action was necessary because the target had misbehaved. This is in line with 
theoretical considerations that ostracism serves as a “warning shot” that should make the 
target adhere to social norms in the future (Kerr et al., 2009). Potentially, whether a person is 
ostracized by others might serve as an important cue for observers regarding whether they 
would personally like to interact with that person. The effects were rather small, though, 
which may be due to the fact that observers knew precisely how the target had acted; research 
has shown that observers tend to rely on their explicit knowledge about the situation before 
they consider behavioral cues from others to form a moral judgement (Rudert et al., 2018). 
Additionally, observers might consider whether sanctioning behavior is socially accepted by 
others or they are likely to become a target of exclusion themselves if they ostracize others. 
When in doubt about the social acceptance of their behavior, observers might choose not to 
sanction even if they judge a behavior as morally wrong.  Consistent with this reasoning, we 
observed that observers’ moral judgement was harsher than their actual sanctions in Study 2.  
The present studies mostly focus on social norms in moral contexts, such as norms 
about honesty (Study 1), fidelity (Study 2), as well as cooperation (Studies 3 and 4). We do 
not investigate the effects of violations of social norms that are merely descriptive norms and 
do not represent moral transgressions. Our assumption is that especially in situations with a 
strong inclusion norm and in which violations of the descriptive norms do not hurt the 
functioning of the group or society in general, it is unlikely that ostracism of such norm-
violating targets would be accepted and not sanctioned by observers. In line with this, Rudert 
and colleagues (2018) showed that ostracizing individuals merely because they are the odd-
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one-out in a group is evaluated negatively by observers. It should be noted, however, that 
norms that are essential for groups or societies often either tend to be moral or become 
moralized over time (Täuber, 2019), as they represent a central part of a group or society’s 
identity and thus will be protected by the respective members.  
General Tendency to Sanction 
In Studies 1-3, sanctioning behavior had no personal consequences so participants had 
neither a direct benefit nor a disadvantage from sanctioning others. An exception is Study 4, 
in which participants were incentivized to act in line with what others perceived as 
acceptable. Still, the lack of personal costs may explain why individuals chose to act very 
generously on average, so that bonuses were relatively high and sanctions relatively mild. 
Most likely, if participants had needed to distribute the money between themselves and 
others, the distributions of money to others would have been lower overall. However, given 
previous research on ostracism and punishment (Will et al., 2013), there is good reason to 
expect that participants would have behaved very similarly even if they had to invest their 
own resources to punish in order to restore fairness.  
Inspection of sanction tendencies across studies further reveals that sanctions in 
Studies 1 and 2 were generally lower than in Studies 3 and 4. On a speculative note, we think 
that this difference arises as a function of the relationship between misbehavior and sanctions. 
In particular, in Studies 1 and 2, sanctions were not directly related to the misbehavior, and 
were relatively mild. In Studies 3 and 4, punishment was relatively harsh, presumably because 
it had a direct relation to the norm-violation (undeserved money is taken away) and 
participants could restore fairness and an equal distribution of resources with their 
punishment. Alternatively, the sources and the target were not friends in Studies 3 and 4, so 
the participants might have felt more entitled to intervene than in a dispute between friends, 
although that does not explain why they intervened at the expense of the target only.  
Interestingly, we found no evidence for compensation of norm-consistent targets of ostracism 
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in any of our studies, even though it has been demonstrated in other research (Wesselmann, 
Wirth, et al., 2013).   
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 Observers have received little attention in ostracism research, despite being able to 
make a critical difference. The judgements as well as the actions or inactions of neutral 
individuals can legitimize the sources’ behavior, or provide support to the target. We 
speculate that intentional ostracism at school, university, or the work place often involves 
more individuals than the target and the sources. Understanding observers’ considerations and 
behavior may prove vital for targets and sources, as well as institutions that wish to protect 
both their culture and individual agents. Most research on observers of ostracism has focused 
on observers empathizing with the targets and/or punishing the sources for violating the 
inclusion norm (Güroğlu et al., 2013; Over & Uskul, 2016; Wesselmann, Williams, et al., 
2013; Will et al., 2013). In contrast, this contribution demonstrates that observers do not 
simply condemn and punish ostracism, nor do they mindlessly side with the sources. Instead, 
observers make distinctive moral judgments in line with the prevailing social norm and 
specifically sanction violations against the respective social norm.  
While this behavior is potentially a strong control mechanism to uphold social norms, it could 
prove problematic: First, observers often have no information about whether the target has 
violated a social norm. Observers then revert to heuristics and stereotypes, for instance, based 
on a target’s facial appearance, to make moral judgements (e.g., Rudert, Reutner, et al., 2017). 
Because some of these cues have little objective validity, these judgments may be prone to 
error. In the worst case, this could result either in undeserved punishment of innocent targets 
for norm violations they have not committed, or in observers turning against a group of 
sources that has merely tried to protect itself from a deviant or selfish target.   
Second, our research indicates that observers also take (possible) reactions of others 
into account. This can be problematic when observers choose not to act in line with their 
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moral judgement because no one else does. This so-called bystander effect (Chekroun & 
Brauer, 2002; Latané & Darley, 1969) might be particularly damaging in ostracism situations, 
because from the target’s perspective, it is possibly hard to distinguish between an 
unresponsive observer and a purposefully ostracizing source.  
Finally, in many cases, sanctions might not be the best way to make others adhere to 
social norms. When the sources feel that they had an acceptable reason for ostracizing, they 
might react with anger when they are punished. Moreover, targets that feel unfairly ostracized 
and/or punished will often withdraw or even aggress against the sources (Ren, Wesselmann, 
& Williams, 2016; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). 
It should be emphasized that our conclusions are derived from experimental data and 
may be fruitfully validated in the field. If the findings replicate with strong effect sizes in a 
more applied context, important implications for persons dealing with ostracism in 
professional contexts may follow (teachers, counselors, conflict mediators, HR employees). 
Of key importance might be the ability and motivation to find out the background of an 
ostracism episode as well as communication about how individuals can deal with norm-
violations and ostracism in a constructive way without reverting to sanctions.  
Conclusion 
Four studies show that observers sanction ostracizing behavior of the sources, but only 
if they feel that the sources had no socially accepted reason. If the target violated social norms 
and was ostracized as a consequence, observers sanctioned the target’s behavior instead. The 
results were driven by considerations of fairness as well as different evaluations of targets and 
sources. 
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Footnotes 
1 In general, the pattern of the responsibility measure in Studies 1-3 was mostly similar 
to the findings for punishment but less consistent. As a compromise between exhaustiveness 
and comprehensibility of the manuscript, we chose to report the findings in an online 
supplement (https://edoc.unibas.ch/70281/) and do not discuss the measure further. 
2 In all studies, excluding participants from the analyses who failed to correctly answer 
one or more manipulation checks neither changed the pattern of results nor the significance 
levels.  
3 In the pre-registration, we stated that we would break down the three-way interaction 
by target and sources. However, when writing the manuscript, we felt that the direct 
comparison between target and sources was more important than the direct comparison 
between the target behavior conditions. Thus, we ultimately decided to split the sample based 
on the target’s behavior in all studies. When splitting the sample by target and sources as 
suggested in the pre-registration, for the target, there is an effect of target behavior, F(1, 414) 
= 310.97, p < .001, η2 = .43, while for the sources, there is a 2-way interaction target behavior 
x ostracism, F(1, 414) = 18.88, p < .001, η2 = .04. 
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Table 1 
Results for Study 1. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Norm-violating  
Target 
Norm-consistent  
Target 
  Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion 
Money (CHF) 
Target 3.07 c (1.66) 3.41 bc  (1.45) 3.82 b (1.45) 4.00 b (1.45) 
Sources 3.78 ab (1.47) 3.78 b (1.29) 3.19 a (1.47) 3.97 b (1.44) 
Participation 
Target 2.20 a (1.42) 4.67 b (1.88) 2.06 a (1.23) 5.13 b (1.36) 
Sources 6.28 c (.99) 5.33 b (.96) 6.57 c (.75) 5.18 b (1.00) 
Excluded - 
Included 
Target 2.48 a (1.15) 4.85 b (1.49) 2.29 a (1.00) 5.43 b (1.29) 
Sources 6.31 c (1.31) 5.28 b (1.00) 6.22 c (1.29) 5.23 b (1.45) 
Ignored - 
Acknowledged 
Target 2.40 a (1.35) 4.44 c (2.03) 2.38 a (1.37) 5.18 c (1.70) 
Sources 6.38 b (1.10) 5.19 c (1.33) 6.22 b (1.19) 5.41 c (1.26) 
Lie Acceptable Target 2.57 b (1.48) 3.07 a (.85) 3.53 a (2.02) 3.97 a (1.77) 
Lie Desirable Target 2.80 a (1.13) 2.62 a (.70) 2.41 a (1.35) 2.53 a (1.25) 
Lie Morally Good Target 2.33 b (1.49) 2.62 b (1.13) 3.62 a (1.71) 3.73 a (1.55) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions, separately for targets 
and sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the 
same column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different 
letters do. 
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Table 2 
Results for Study 2. 
 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the six experimental conditions, separately for targets and 
sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the same 
column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different letters 
do. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Norm-violating  
Target (strong) 
Norm-violating  
Target (weak) 
Norm-consistent  
Target 
  Exclusion Control Exclusion Control Exclusion Control 
Money (CHF) Target 3.10 ac(1.82) 2.34 c  (1.90) 3.70 ab (1.40) 3.97 bd (1.40) 3.45 ab (1.76) 4.00 b (1.44)
Sources 3.74 b (1.45) 3.41 ab (1.40) 3.33 ab (1.61) 4.42 d (1.02) 2.23 c (1.49) 4.03 abd (1.21)
Participation Target 2.21 a (.77)  2.50 a (1.50)  1.91 a (.61)  
Sources 6.72 b (.64)  6.63 b (.68)  6.84 b (.32)  
Excluded - 
Included 
Target 2.43 a (.50)  2.83 a (1.24)  2.36 a (.73)  
Sources 6.82 b (.35)  6.56 b (.84)  6.57 b (.62)  
Ignored -  
Acknowledged 
Target 2.65 a (.89)  2.96 a (1.30)  2.67 a (.91)  
Sources 6.75 b (.51)  6.56 b (.83)  6.55 b (.61)  
Morally Good Target 2.60 a (.83) 2.94 a (1.24) 3.08 a (1.42) 2.82 a (1.29) 5.00 b (1.84) 5.12 b (1.78)
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Table 3 
Results for Study 3. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Norm-violating  
Target 
Norm-consistent  
Target 
  Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion 
Subtracted  
Money (£) 
Target 1.29 a (.89) 1.09 a  (.92) .15 b (.45) .21 b (.51) 
Sources .08 b (.40) .13 b (.43) .37 a (.56) .20 ab (.49) 
Evaluation  
Target 2.93 c (1.64) 3.57 b (1.54) 6.01 a (0.96) 5.91 a (1.11) 
Sources 6.21 a (1.04) 5.94 a (1.07) 4.02 b (1.52) 5.89 a (1.06) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions, separately for targets 
and sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the 
same column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different 
letters do. 
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Table 4 
 
Results for Study 4. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Norm-violating  
Target 
Norm-consistent  
Target 
  Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion Inclusion 
Subtracted  
Money (p) 
Target 6.67 a (4.09) 6.22 a  (3.93) 0.83 b (2.16) 0.90 b (2.26) 
Sources 0.61 b (1.96) 0.95 b (2.26) 2.40 c (2.89) 0.78 ab (2.01) 
Evaluation 
Target 2.71 a (1.39) 2.95 a (1.52) 6.08 b (1.06) 6.13 b (.79) 
Sources 6.10 b (.91) 5.51 d (1.05) 3.99 c (1.43) 6.04 b (.86) 
Fairness 
Target 2.14 a (1.56) 2.70 c (1.67) 6.36 b (1.18) 6.61 b (.98) 
Sources 6.10 b (1.11) 5.81 b (1.24) 4.34 d (1.67) 6.62 b (.88) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions, separately for targets 
and sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the 
same column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different 
letters do. 
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Figure 1. Mean levels of the distributed amount of money for targets and sources (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) as a function of ostracism and norm consistency in Study 1. The 
exclusion condition is displayed as grey bars and the inclusion condition as white bars. 
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Figure 2. Mean levels of the distributed amount of money for targets and sources (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) as a function of ostracism and norm consistency in Study 2. The 
exclusion condition is displayed as grey bars and the control condition as white bars. 
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Figure 3. Mean levels of the amount of money subtracted from targets and sources (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) as a function of ostracism and norm consistency in Study 3. The 
exclusion condition is displayed as grey bars and the inclusion condition as white bars. 
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Figure 4. Mean levels of the amount of money subtracted from targets and sources (with 95% 
Confidence Intervals) as a function of ostracism and norm consistency in Study 4. The 
exclusion condition is displayed as grey bars and the inclusion condition as white bars. 
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